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A  central,  organizing  motif of Cass  Sunstein's work is the  effort  to  spell out the
consequences  of  the  New  Deal  for  American  law.  The  critique  of  common-law
baselines, l  the  influence  of Dewey  and Roosevelt, 2  the emphasis  on  the benefits  (and
costs,  but  especially  benefits)  of  technocratic  government, 3  including  cost-benefit
analysis  itself, can  all  be  seen  in  this  light.  Indeed  this  motif is  explicit  in  some  of
Sunstein's most famous contributions,  including his idea of a New Deal for free speech. 4
I suggest  that  anyone  who  shares  Sunstein's  premises  can  and  should  go  even
further in this direction.  The logical consequence of Sunstein's views  is a New  Deal for
all civil  liberties and personal liberties, not just economic  liberties and free  speech.  As
with economic and free speech rights, civil liberties in criminal law, procedure, and cases
growing  out  of the  Global  War  on  Terror  should  be  approached  through  New  Deal
lenses.  Such liberties will  ultimately have to justify themselves at the bar of cost-benefit
analysis,  rather  than through  appeals  to  the  meaning  of liberty,  the  intrinsic  value  of
human dignity, or other abstractions.
I will discuss several major Sunsteinian  commitments,  all of which are outgrowths
of the progressive  commitments  of the  New  Deal,  broadly  understood:  the  Deweyan
conception  of liberty  as  a  claim  to  exercise  legal  and  social  control,  a  claim  that
undermines  common-law  baselines;  the claim  that  all  rights are  costly  to  enforce  and
hence  positive rather  than negative;  the critique of precautionary  principles  in favor  of
cost-benefit  analysis  and technocratic  government;  and the Rooseveltian  conception  of
security as an intrinsic component of liberty.  These commitments cut across the standard
distinction,  in  constitutional  theory,  between "economic"  and "personal"  liberties.  On
Sunstein's premises,  there  is  no  basis  for a  partial New  Deal  that  stops short of civil
liberties.  To be sure, even given those premises, political or institutional differences  may
*  John  H.  Watson  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  Prepared  for  a  symposium  on  "The
Scholarship  of Cass  R.  Sunstein"  to  be  published  by  the  Tulsa  Law  Review.  Thanks  to  Richard  Fallon,
Michael  Klarman,  Daryl  Levinson, Martha  Minow, and  Eric Posner  for helpful  comments, and to Joel  Peters-
Fransen for helpful  research assistance.
1.  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Constitutionalism after  the New  Deal,  101  Harv.  L.  Rev.  421,  501-04  (1987)
[hereinafter  Sunstein,  Constitutionalism]; see generally Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Lochner's Legacy,  87  Colum.  L.
Rev. 873 (1987).
2.  See generally e.g. Cass  R.  Sunstein,  The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and Why
We Need It More Than Ever (Basic  Bks.  2004).
3.  See Cass R.  Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,  99  Mich. L. Rev.  1651,  1688 (2001).
4.  Cass R. Sunstein, Free  Speech Now, 59 U.  Chi. L. Rev. 255, 299-300 (1992).
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nonetheless  justify  some  sort  of distinction  between  economic  and  personal  liberties.
But I will suggest that, in fact,  Sunstein can recognize no difference between the two that
is sufficiently systematic to underwrite a wholesale distinction of that sort.
To  illustrate  the argument,  I  apply  Sunsteinian  commitments  to several  doctrines,
rules,  and policy  issues in  criminal  law,  criminal procedure,  and counterterrorism  law.
First,  capital  punishment,  given  certain  empirical  assumptions,  redistributes  a kind  of
liberty  from  one  social  group  to  another  and  thus  has  excellent  Deweyan  credentials.
Second,  the  reasonable  doubt  rule  in  criminal  trials  is,  in  effect,  a  "precautionary
principle"  against  erroneous  convictions  and  is  highly  suspect  under  cost-benefit
analysis.  Finally,  the  right  of individuals  charged  with  enemy  combatant  status  to
discover all  "reasonably  available"  evidence 5 is,  in  effect,  a costly government-funded
positive  right.  Most  broadly,  we  might  understand  the  Global  War  on  Terror  in
Deweyan  and Rooseveltian  terms,  as what Dewey  called  "great  movements  for human
liberation"6-a  movement  aimed to produce  security, understood  in Rooseveltian  terms
as  "freedom from fear."
7
In all these cases,  I  suggest  Sunsteinian commitments  undermine justifications  for
standard  civil-libertarian  views.  Although  in some cases cost-benefit analysis  might end
up  justifying  the  same  positions  for which  civil-libertarians  argue,  it would  do  so  on
different  grounds,  and  is  unlikely  to  support  as  robust  a  package  of rights  as  civil-
libertarians  desire.  Surprisingly,  Sunstein  joins  hands  with  libertarian  critics  of  the
"preferred  position"  doctrine  in  constitutional  law,  such as  Richard Epstein,  who  deny
that there  is any distinction, in law or political morality, between  economic and personal
liberties. 8  Both  Sunstein  and  the libertarian  critics  want  (or should  want,  given  their
other premises) consistent treatment of economic and personal  liberties.  The difference,
however, is  that the libertarians want both types  of liberties  to be declared  fundamental
and constitutionally  protected  at a high level.  By  contrast,  the  logical  consequence  of
Sunstein's  views  is that  both  types of liberties  must prove  their  contribution to  overall
social welfare, 9 and in consequence  must pass under the harrow of cost-benefit analysis.
I.  DEWEY: LIBERTY-LIBERTY  TRADEOFFS
I  will  focus  on  Dewey's  essay  of 1935  entitled  "Liberty  and  Social  Control," 1 0
5.  Bismullah v.  Gates, 501  F.3d  178,  180 (D.C.  Cir.  2007)  [hereinafter  Bismullah 1],  vacated, 128 S.  Ct.
2960 (2008).  See also 32 C.F.R. § 9.5(h) (2003).
6.  John Dewey, Liberty and Social Control,  in John Dewey:  The Later Works, 1925-1953 vol. 2, 360, 362
(Jo Ann  Boydston ed.,  S.  111.  U.  Press 1987).
7.  Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address,  The Annual Message to the Congress (77th Congress, D.C., Jan.
6,  1941)  (copy  on file with Franklin & Eleanor  Roosevelt Inst.).
8.  See  Richard  A.  Epstein,  The  Indivisibility of Liberty under the Bill of Rights,  15  Harv.  J.L.  & Pub.
Policy 35, 40 (1992).
9.  Or to some other specified theory of value, which might include  welfare as a component but have other
components as well, such as liberty understood as a good independent of welfare.  Nothing in my analysis turns
on  what exactly Sunstein's value theory is taken to  be, so long as costs and benefits  can be compared  in terms
of the relevant values.  I will use "welfare"  as a placeholder and shorthand  for Sunstein's value  theory, with the
foregoing qualifications understood.
10.  Dewey, supra n.  6,  at  360-63.  Dewey's  essay  has  many  progressive  precursors,  such  as  Leonard
Hobhouse.  See L.T. Hobhouse,  Liberalism and Other Writings 81-84 (James  Meadowcraft  ed.,  Cambridge  U.
Press  1994) (cited  in Barbara  H.  Fried,  The Progressive  Assault on Laissez Faire:  Robert Hale and the First
[Vol. 43:921
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whose  themes  underpin  and  animate  the  famous  critique  of common-law  baselines
initiated by  Robert  Hale  and  completed by  Sunstein.
2  Dewey's  central  argument is
that  it  is  illusory,  a  kind  of  conceptual  mistake,  to  contrast  "social  control"  or
government  "intervention"  on the one hand with liberty on the other.  A claim of liberty
is itself a claim to exercise social control over others, control enforced by law or politics.
Dewey argues  that liberty "is  power, effective power to do specific things";
13 that
"the  possession  of effective  power  is always  a matter  of the distribution  of power  that
exists at the time"; 14 and that "[t]he  system of liberties that exists at any time  is always
the system of restraints or controls that exists at that time." 15  These points mean that
liberty  is  always  a  social question,  not  an  individual  one.  For  the  liberties  that  any
individual actually  has depends upon the distribution of powers or liberties  that exists, and
this distribution is identical with actual social arrangements, legal  and political-and, at the
present time, economic, in a peculiarly  important way.16
The  consequence  is that government  "intervention"  does  not curtail  liberty in the
name of some other good.  Rather, it trades off one kind of liberty for another, in a  way
that might be taken to maximize  liberty overall, and it redistributes liberty  from some to
others.  In  short,  Dewey  defends  a  picture  of liberty-liberty tradeoffs: curtailing  the
liberty of some can increase  the liberty  of others,  insofar as "a more equal  and equitable
balance  of powers that  will  enhance  and multiply the  effective  liberties  of the  mass  of
individuals."17
Of  course,  Dewey  wrote  against  the  backdrop  of  a  struggle  over  economic
liberties,  but  nothing in  his  arguments  is  tied to  that  setting.  For personal  liberties,  no
less  than  economic  ones,  it  is  true  that,  as  Dewey  continued,  "historically  the  great
movements for human liberation have always been movements to change institutions  and
not  to  preserve  them  intact"-movements  "to  bring  about  a  changed  distribution  of
power  to do-and power  to  think and to  express  thought  is  a power  to do-such  that
there  would  be  a more  balanced,  a more  equal,  even,  and equitable  system  of human
liberties."
18  The redistribution of liberty would "increase  significant human liberties."
' 19
In this sense, Dewey argues for liberty what Benthamites argued for utility, based on the
diminishing  marginal  utility  of income:  redistribution  can  itself  maximize  aggregate
liberty (or utility), if curtailing the liberty of the few would enable a different distribution
that creates  a greater increase in the liberty of the many.
A.  Life-Life Tradeoffs: Deweyan Capital  Punishment
The purest case of the liberty-liberty  tradeoff arises when the "social  control"  that
Law and Economics Movement 34 (Harv. U.  Press  1998)).
11.  See generally Fried, supra n.  10.
12.  See Sunstein, Constitutionalism,  supra  n. 1.
13.  Dewey, supra n. 6, at 360.
14. Id. at 361  (emphasis in original).
15.  Id. (emphasis omitted).
16.  Id. at 362 (emphasis in original).
17.  Id.
18.  Dewey, supra  n.  6,  at  362.
19. Id.
2008]
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Dewey  emphasized-not  as opposed  to  liberty,  but as constitutive  of liberty-requires
the deprivation  of a  murderer's  life  and hence  liberty  in  order to  protect  the  lives and
hence  liberties  of  many  others.  Sunstein  and  a  co-author  have  argued  that  capital
punishment  poses  a  life-life  tradeoff,  given  the  empirical  stipulation  that  capital
punishment  deters  killings  and  thus  results  in  more  lives  saved  than  lost.20   If the
protection of the life, and therefore  liberty, of some citizens requires that those who have
committed murder  be deprived  of their  lives,  and if the collateral  costs  and benefits  of
running the system of capital punishment are set to one side, there can be no objection to
capital punishment on  the  score of "liberty";  rather concern  for  liberty mandates that it
be  used.  On  these  assumptions,  capital  punishment  in  effect  redistributes  liberty  in  a
way  that  maximizes  effective  liberty  overall,  and  thus  has  impeccable  Deweyan
credentials.  The  structure of the argument  is identical to the argument for redistribution
of economic liberties.
The  issue  here  is  not a  tradeoff between  "state  killings"  and  "private  killings."
This  is  to  presuppose  a  distinction  between  state  action  and  state  inaction,  between
governmental  acts  and  governmental  omissions, that  Dewey's  and  Sunstein's premises
rule out.2 1  The state faces  a choice between different policy regimes, one in  which there
is capital punishment, yielding a certain number of killings, and one in which  some other
package  of policies  is  in place, yielding another number of killings; the  state's task  is to
pick the  set of policies that minimizes  killings overall.  There  is no avoiding state action
and nothing  to  be  gained  by  calling  one  set  of killings  "state  killings"  and  another
"private killings."  The  state is itself a causal agent in "private" killings, in the sense that
with  a  different  set of policies  and  a  different  level  and  distribution  of enforcement
resources, the private killings would not have occurred.
Dewey  would  emphasize  that  the  legal,  political  and  social  arrangements  that
causally  underwrite  "private"  killings  are  themselves  institutions  of social  control,  and
that  there  is  no  choice  between  exercising  social  control,  or  not,  in  this  domain.
Government acts in either event.  As far as liberty is concerned,  the only question is what
set of policies  creates  the  best overall  distribution  of liberties.  If capital  punishment
controls  the  liberty  of some  in  ways  that  "enhance[s]  and  multipl[ies]  the  effective
liberties  of the mass of individuals," 22 then the  legal regime  that employs it is superior
overall.  Given  appropriate  empirical  stipulations  about  deterrence,  Deweyan  capital
20.  See generally Cass R.  Sunstein &  Adrian Vermeule,  Is  Capital  Punishment Morally Required?  Acts,
Omissions,  and Life-Life  Tradeoffs,  58  Stan.  L.  Rev.  703  (2005).  For debate  about  the  empirical  issues,
compare  John  J. Donohue  & Justin  Wolfers,  Uses and  Abuses of Empirical Evidence  in the  Death  Penalty
Debate, 58  Stan.  L.  Rev.  791  (2005)  with  Hashem  Dezhbakhsh,  Paul  H.  Rubin  & Joanna  M.  Shepherd,  Does
Capital Punishment  Have a Deterrent  Effect? New Evidence from  Postmoratorium Panel Data,  5 Am.  L. &
Econ.  Rev.  344  (2003)  and  Hashem  Dezhbakhsh  &  Paul  H.  Rubin,  From  the  "Econometrics  of Capital
Punishment"  to  the  "Capital  Punishment"  of Econometrics:  On  the  Use  and Abuse of Sensitivity Analysis
(Emory  U.  Sch.  L.,  Pub.  L.  &  Leg.  Theory  Research  Paper  Series  No.  07-21  &  L.  &  Econ.  Research  Paper
Series No. 07-18,  2007) (available  at http://ssrn.com/abstract=O18533).  For discussion of the conceptual  and
normative  issues,  compare  Carol  S.  Steiker, No,  Capital  Punishment  Is  Not  Morally Required:  Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death  Penalty, 58  Stan.  L.  Rev.  751  (2005)  with Cass  R.  Sunstein & Adrian  Vermeule,
Deterring Murder:  A Reply, 58 Stan.  L.  Rev.  847 (2005).  See also David  Enoch,  Intending, Foreseeing,  and
the State,  13 Leg. Theory  69 (2007).
2  1.  See generally Robert E. Goodin,  Utilitarianism  as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge  U.  Press  1995).
22.  Dewey, supra n. 6, at 362.
[Vol.  43:921
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punishment  is the logical consequence of major New Deal commitments.
II.  THE COST OF RIGHTS
Sunstein and Stephen Holmes argue powerfully  that all legal rights cost something
to enforce  and hence  require  affirmative  government  action to give  them  substance;  in
this sense,  all  legal  rights  are positive.23  It  is not possible to refute  this view with  the
philosophical  observations  that  moral  rights  do  not derive  from government  action,  or
that one can in principle specify strictly negative  legal duties binding government agents
("it is illegal to torture").  Although these conceptual points are undoubtedly correct, they
miss Sunstein's point, which is strictly pragmatic.  The cash value of any right, whether
moral  or legal,  is  ultimately determined  by  the  resources  that  government directs  to  its
enforcement.  In the case of torture, government  must invest in a system  for monitoring
and disciplining the lower-level agents who can inflict torture, and if it does not, the right
not to be tortured is worthless; consider Abu Ghraib.
The  original  target  of the  cost  of rights  thesis  was  economic  libertarianism  in
certain  versions,  particularly  versions  that overlook  that  "liberty  depends  on  taxes."24
Here we see the deep affinity between the cost of rights argument and Dewey's point that
the  opposition  between  liberty  and  social  control  is entirely  illusory.  Yet  the cost  of
rights  thesis, like Dewey's view  of liberty,  is  entirely  general  and covers the  "personal"
rights emphasized by civil-libertarians  just as well  as the  "economic"  rights emphasized
by  free-marketers.  Sunstein  and Holmes  use  the  example  of rights  to  humane prison
conditions;25 nothing  in their theory supports any distinction between the economic  and
the  personal  rights.  Of course  there is  always  a  separate  question  about  the  costs and
benefits  of recognizing  and  implementing  particular  positive  rights,  but  economic  and
personal rights do not stand on any different footing in this regard.
A.  Combatant  Status Review Tribunals
A  topical  example  of the  cost  of rights  thesis  involves  the  constitutional  and
statutory  law that  determines  what process is due to individuals,  almost all noncitizens,
who  are  brought  before  Combatant  Status  Review  Tribunals  for  a  determination  of
whether  or  not  they  are  enemy  combatants.26   In  the  latest  round  of  litigation,
culminating  in  several  decisions  by  the Court  of Appeals for  the District of Columbia
Circuit in Bismullah v.  Gates,27 the  issue has been  what materials  are to be included  in
the record  on judicial  review.28  The  appellate court said that  the record should include
not just  the  evidence  presented  at  the  tribunal  hearing,  but  all  evidence  "reasonably
23.  See Stephen  Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein,  The Cost of  Rights:  Why Liberty Depends on  Taxes 48 (W.W.
Norton & Co.  1999).
24.  Id.  at 61,  71.
25.  Id. at 78-79.
26.  Bismullah 1,  501  F.3d at 180.
27.  See generally Bismullah 1, 501  F.3d at  178, mot. for rehearing denied, Bismullah IL  503  F.3d  137,  137
(D.C.  Cir.  2007)  [hereinafter  Bismullah 11],  pet. for rehearing  en  banc denied, Bismullah  11,  514  F.3d  1291,
1291  (D.C. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Bismullah III], vacated, 128  S. Ct. 2960 (2008).
28.  Bismullahl, 501  F.3dat  180.
2008]
5
Vermeule: A New Deal for Civil Liberties: An Essay in Honor of Cass R. Suns
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007TULSA  LAW REVIEW
available"  in government  files, of any agency.2 9  The government  protested vehemently
about the costs of this affirmative  obligation to search through all government  files; 3the
directors of the major intelligence agencies  filed a joint declaration  that the costs of this
procedure are prohibitive;3 1  when the full court denied en banc review by a split 5-5 vote,
dissenting  judges  pointed  out  that  the  court's  holding  afforded  tribunal  defendants
procedural  rights  to discovery that are arguably  broader than  those  of ordinary  criminal
defendants.
32
If the  appellate  court's  ruling  holds  up,  it  will  have  created  a  costly  procedural
right-both  in terms of the direct cost of collecting the relevant information, and in terms
of the opportunity cost of distraction from other intelligence and counterterrorism  tasks.
Perhaps the costs  are worth paying.  But to evaluate  that, one would want to know how
the costs will be paid, and where the required resources  will come  from.  If the time and
money spent generating a full record for detainees on appeal  is time and money not spent
on initial determinations of enemy combatant status, or on creating humane  conditions of
confinement  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  or  on  preventing  torture  by  low-level  military
personnel,  or  on  providing  resources  to  ordinary  defendants  in  the  criminal  justice
system,  then  from  an  overall  perspective  protecting  these  rights  may  have  perverse
consequences.  The illusion  here  is that  "the  government"  should "bear the  costs."  In
this domain,  no less than in economic domains, the incidence of the cost of rights is all-
important.
33
III.  PRECAUTIONARY  PRINCIPLES  VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Sunstein  is a proponent-with  qualifications,  and nuances,  but still a proponent-
of  cost-benefit  analysis,  which  in  the  finest  New  Deal  style  he  defends  in  both
technocratic  and  democratic  terms.  Part  of  his  case  for  cost-benefit  analysis  is  a
withering  critique  of the  major  alternatives,  particularly  the  so-called  "precautionary
principle."34  The  principle  comes in  several  versions,  but Sunstein's  main  targets are
environmental  and regulatory precautionary  principles which hold that under uncertainty
about  scientific  causation  and  the effects  of potential  policies,  the presumption  lies  in
favor of "taking precautions"  to protect human health and the environment.
Sunstein  argues  powerfully  that  this  sort  of principle  is  incoherent,  at  least  as
usually understood. 35  For one thing, regulatory  or environmental  risks might be on  all
sides of the  issue.  Imposing  a moratorium on the construction of nuclear  plants,  out of
precautionary  concern  for  the  environment,  produces  greater  reliance  on  coal-burning,
creating  harm  to  the environment.  In  cases  of this  sort, the  precautionary  principle  is
29.  See id.
30.  Bismullah 11,  503 F.3d at  140.
31.  Seeid. at  138-39n. 1.
32.  See Bismullah 111, 514 F.3d at  1299-1300 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
33.  Cf Daryl  J. Levinson, Making Government  Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67  U. Chi.  L. Rev. 345, 345-346 (2000).
34.  See  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Laws of Fear:  Beyond the Precautionary  Principle 3-5  (Cambridge  U.  Press
2005).
35.  Id. at  14.
[Vol. 43:921
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self-defeating  and "paralyzing." 36  Even if the  same risks are not  directly  implicated on
both  sides  of the  ledger,  the  costs  of following  the  precautionary  principle  may  have
deleterious  indirect  effects  on human health or the environment  because richer  societies
are  generally  cleaner  and  healthier  societies  or  on  welfare  generally  because  a  clean
environment  is just one good among many.  Sunstein argues powerfully that cost-benefit
analysis,  whatever its conceptual  faults and practical difficulties,  is the only analytic tool
that  is  in  principle  designed  to  yield  an  impartial  accounting  of the  risks,  costs,  and
benefits  on all sides of such questions.
37
Here  too, however, nothing  in the critique of precautionary  principles  is limited to
environmental  or regulatory  contexts.  Sunstein's  points hold whenever  some  artificial
skew  is built into a social  decision-rule,  such  that following  the  decision rule plausibly
produces greater harms overall-perhaps  on the  very dimensions that motivate the skew,
perhaps  on  a  larger  calculus  of welfare.  And  as  it turns  out,  central  features  of the
criminal law display these features.
A.  The Reasonable  Doubt Rule as a Precautionary  Principle
Consider  the reasonable  doubt rule,  which holds that the  defendant  in a federal  or
state  criminal  trial  must  go  free  if there  is  any  reasonable  doubt  in  his  favor.  The
traditional justification,  stemming  from Blackstone,  is that it is better that ten guilty men
go  free than  that one innocent man  be convicted.38  This is a precautionary principle;  it
says,  in effect,  that under  conditions of uncertainty about  who  is really guilty  and  who
innocent,  the risk of a false positive or conviction  of the innocent will  be weighted  ten
times as heavily as a false negative, or an acquittal of the guilty.
Why  should this be so?  On the  Sunsteinian  view, the  reasonable  doubt rule is a
dubious  precautionary  principle  at  best.  For  one  thing,  the  traditional  justification
ignores  substitute risks and risk-risk tradeoffs. 39  If the ten guilty  men go  on to commit
more crimes  against innocent third parties, then harms to the innocent may well increase
overall.  It  requires a kind of dogmatic confidence  in the ten to  one ratio,  one that rests
on little in the way of facts, to think the reasonable doubt rule sacrosanct.  Nor does the
rule rest on any widespread consensus  over time and across space;  if n is the number of
guilty men who should go free to avoid the conviction of one innocent, then n has ranged
from  one  to  ten  to  one  hundred  and  even  higher.  Cost-benefit  analysis  of  the
reasonable  doubt  rule  is  difficult,  in  part  because  it  is  hard  to  know  who  is  in  fact
innocent or guilty,  but empiricists  have cracked harder nuts than this.  There  is no reason
to think  that  the  best one  can do  is  throw up  one's hands  and,  for some  reason, pull a
high  value  for  n  out  of  thin  air.  At  a  minimum,  courts  lack  sufficient  basis  for
36.  Id. at 26.
37.  See id. at  129-31.
38.  Blackstone's Commentaries on  the Laws of England vol.  4,  282  (Wayne  Morrison  ed.,  Cavendish
Publg.  2001)  (It  appears  the cited information can  be located in most versions of Blackstone's Commentaries  at
[358]).
39.  For a  pellucid analysis of the  relevant costs and benefits,  see  Ronald J.  Allen  & Larry  Laudan, Deadly
Dilemmas, 41  Tex. Tech  L.  Rev. 65 (2008).
40.  Alexander  Volokh, n Guilty Men,  146 U. Pa. L. Rev.  173,  175-76 (1997).
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confidence  in the ten  to one ratio that they should invalidate  legislative measures setting
a different ratio, within broadly rational  limits.
Thus,  the  reasonable doubt  rule and the  traditional  ten to  one ratio  are  abrogated,
quite  sensibly,  when  the costs  of false  negatives  seem  higher than usual,  according  to
some impressionistic judicial calculus.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,41  for example, a plurality
held that in hearings  to determine enemy  combatant  status, the burden of proof could be
placed on the alleged enemy combatant  to disprove  the government's  evidence. 42  Here
the  costs  of mistakenly  releasing  an  enemy  are  high;  many  detainees  released  from
Guantanamo have reappeared  as jihadis in Iraq or Afghanistan. 43  So  the judges relaxed
the  reasonable  doubt  rule,  even  though  the  cost  of a  mistaken  positive  finding  of
combatant status is the indefinite  preventive detention  of the innocent-arguably  worse,
from the  standpoint  of a  risk-averse  innocent,  than  a  term  certain  with the  equivalent
expected  duration.  Decisions  of this  sort rest  on a  kind of implicit  and  unsystematic
cost-benefit  analysis  that belie the  precautionary  principle  embodied  in  the  reasonable
doubt rule.  That rule might or might not be cost-justified,  in some ultimate perspective,
but its  claim to justification  is no better  than the various  regulatory  and  environmental
precautionary principles that Sunstein has demolished.
IV.  THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AS A LIBERATION  MOVEMENT
In  recent  years  Sunstein  has  become  more  directly  interested  in  Roosevelt,
particularly  Roosevelt's  1944  proposal  for  a  "Second  Bill  of Rights."44  The  larger
context  of that  proposal,  Sunstein  shows,  was  Roosevelt's  view  that  security  is  an
indispensable  precondition  for  liberty,  and  indeed  is  itself  a  component  of  liberty.
Security meant  freedom--especially  "freedom  from want" and "freedom  from  fear,"  the
former  referring  to  economic  deprivation,  the  latter  to  the  fear  of the  devastation  of
war.45   Roosevelt  also  included  civil  liberties  among  those  freedoms,  and  included
security from  governmental  overreaching  as  a component of liberty. 46  But the logic of
Roosevelt's  view, here  tracking  Dewey,  is  that  fear of the  state would have  no special
priority  over  the  fear  and  insecurity-the  loss  of  freedom--occasioned  by  pervasive
political and social risks that state action might address, and diminish.
Among  those  risks  that  create  fear  and  thereby  diminish  freedom  is  the  risk  of
catastrophic  terrorist attack.  In this light,  it is  straightforward  to see the Global  War on
Terror  as  what  Dewey  called  a  "great  movement  for  human  liberation." 47
Counterterrorism  policy  in  effect  redistributes  special  liberties  from  the  few-those
surveilled, or detained, or searched-to  the many, who are afflicted by risk and  fear.  Just
as redistribution of the liberty bound up in economic and property rights from the few to
41.  542 U.S.  507 (2004).
42.  Id. at 534.
43.  Alissa J. Rubin, Bomber's Final  Messages Exhort Fighters against U.S.,  157 N.Y. Times  A14 (May  9,
2008).
44.  See generally Sunstein, supra n. 2.
45.  Id. at 81-82.
46.  Id. at 76.
47.  Dewey, supra n. 6, at  362.
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the  many  might  be  utility-maximizing,  and  was  a major  accomplishment  of the  New
Deal, so too reducing the risks and fears that afflict the many, by curtailing the  liberty of
the  few, can increase  liberty overall.
In Rooseveltian  terms, then, freedom  from the fear of terrorism, produced by non-
state actors,  is a straightforward extension of freedom from the fear of war, produced  by
sovereign  states.  None  of this  is to say  that  any and all counterterror  policies  are cost-
justified, in terms  of welfare, or will  increase liberty overall; they may or may not do so.
But it is  to say that counterterror  policies can be justified in affirmative Rooseveltian and
Deweyan  terms,  not  as  the  intrusion  of security  or  social  control  on  liberty,  but  as a
positive means for securing an essential type of liberty-freedom from fear.
V.  SUNSTEIN AND  THE "PREFERRED  POSITION"
Since  the  Carolene Products decision of 1938,
4 8 with its famous  footnote  four,  a
standard  view  in  American  constitutional  law  and theory  has been  some  version of the
so-called  "preferred  position"  doctrine-the  idea  that  constitutional  judicial  review
should  be  used  to  protect  personal  liberties  but  not  economic  ones.49   In  later
constitutional  theory this was given process-based  theoretical underpinnings,  as  in John
Hart  Ely's theory  of representation-reinforcing  judicial  review.50   But  the  earlier  and
simpler version was just that personal liberties were fundamental  in a way that economic
liberties were not.  In  the  1940s,  the New Deal Court,  reconstituted  by Roosevelt,  split
over civil liberties issues;  some justices, such as Frankfurter, generalized  the New Deal's
commitments  into  a broad  position  of judicial deference  to legislative  outcomes,  while
others  thought  the  lesson  of  1937  was  simply  that  judges  should  not  interfere  with
economic  regulation.  "The  majority  of  the  Justices  had  a  narrow  conception  of
substantive  due  process  [in  economic  rights  cases];  Justice  Frankfurter  had  a narrow
conception of  judicial review."
51
The logical consequence of Sunstein's commitments  is that libertarian critics of the
"preferred  position"  doctrine  in American  constitutional  law,  such  as  Richard  Epstein,
are quite correct to criticize the  elevation of personal  liberties over economic ones.  The
Sunsteinian  can form  an alliance  of convenience  with the systematic  libertarian,  as both
think (or  should think, given  everything  else  they think)  that the disparate treatment  of
the two types of liberty is unjustified.  The libertarians, however, want to level up,  so that
economic  liberties  are  accorded  the  same  fundamental  status  that  constitutional  law
currently  affords  to  a wide  range  of personal  liberties.  By  contrast,  Sunstein's  views
imply  that  neither  type  of liberty  is  fundamental  in  itself;  liberties  are  valuable  only
insofar  as they contribute  to welfare.  The libertarian would describe this perspective  as
leveling  down.  So the  alliance of convenience,  formed in favor of consistent treatment
48.  See generally U.S. v. Carolene Prods.  Co.,  304 U.S.  144 (1938).
49.  For  a  discussion  of the  historical  background of and  subsequent debate  over the  "preferred  position"
doctrine,  see  Peter Linzer,  The Carolene  Products  Footnote and the Preferred  Position of Individual Rights:
Louis Lusky and  John Hart Ely vs. Harlan  Fiske Stone, 12  Const. Commentary 277 (1995).
50.  See generally John  Hart  Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A  Theory of Judicial  Review  (Harv.  U.  Press
1980).
51.  David  P.  Currie,  The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position  Debate, 1941-1946,
37 Cath.  U.  L. Rev. 39, 54 (1987).
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for economic  and personal  liberties,  falls  apart over the question whether  the  treatment
should be consistently strong or instead-so the libertarian fears-consistently weak.
Two  important  qualifications  are  necessary  here.  First,  nothing  in  Sunstein's
commitments  bars the possibility that when the cost-benefit analysis of rights  is done, it
will just  so  happen  that  economic  rights  are  less  often  found  cost-justified  than  are
personal  rights.  Perhaps  personal  rights  contribute  more to welfare  or are  less costly to
define,  implement  and  protect.  While  this  is  possible,  cost-benefit  analysis  seems
unlikely to support a wholesale distinction.  Both economic rights and personal rights are
blurry  and internally heterogeneous  categories;  some of the former will pass cost-benefit
muster,  as  will  some  of the latter,  and  it is  difficult  to  see  any basis  for thinking  that
economic rights will systematically  fare differently  than personal ones.
Second,  the  "preferred  position"  can  also  be  justified,  not  on  the  basis  of
substantive differences  in the cost-benefit analysis  of the two types of rights,  but instead
in  institutional  terms,  as  a  strategy  of judicial  review.  Perhaps  economic  liberties,  in
which many have a stake, systematically enjoy more protection  from the political process
than do the personal liberties  of the few,  so that judicial protection  is more necessary  for
personal than economic liberties;  this is a minority-protecting  conception of the preferred
position  distinction.52  Perhaps  representatives  are  more  likely  to  entrench themselves,
choking  off  the  channels  of political  change,  by  curtailing  personal  as  opposed  to
economic  liberties;  this  is  a  majority-protecting  version  of the  preferred  position.53
Alternatively,  one might hold that the  costs of judicial protection are  lower for personal
liberties  than  for economic  ones if personal  liberties are  easier  for judges to  define and
apply.  In  a similar  fashion,  when  the  debate  among  the New  Deal  Justices  over  the
"preferred  position"  was  at  its hottest,  Justice  Jackson  suggested  that  "[m]uch  of the
vagueness  of  the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions  of the First
[Amendment]  become its standard [through the doctrine of incorporation]."
54
Nothing  in  Sunstein's  commitments  necessarily  bars  these  sorts  of institutional
considerations  for some version of the preferred position.  Again, however, it just seems
highly unlikely  that any wholesale  difference  between  economic  and personal  liberties
could be justified on grounds like these.  Pace Ely, there is no general reason to think that
political  processes  are  systematically  more  likely  to  protect  economic  than  personal
liberties;  indeed,  two  generations  of  interest-group  theory  have  suggested  that
minoritarian  deprivation  of the  economic  liberties  of the  many  is  at  least  as  great  a
concern  as  majoritarian  deprivation  of the personal  liberties  of the  few. 55  Likewise,
there  is no  general  reason to  think that the Ins  can more  easily entrench  themselves  by
curtailing  the  personal  liberties  of the Outs than by  curtailing  their  economic  liberties;
consider  the  worry  that  the  Ins  will  use  the  power  of eminent  domain  to  pay  public
money for property that will then be transferred  to private interests who support the  Ins,
52.  See Ely, supra n.  50, at  106-07.
53.  See  id. at  78;  see generally  Michael  J.  Klarman,  Majoritarian  Judicial Review:  The  Entrenchment
Problem, 85 Geo.  L.J.  491  (1997).
54.  W.  Va.  St.  Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
55.  Cf Bruce A. Ackerman,  Beyond Carolene  Products, 98  Harv.  L. Rev.  713 (1985).
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perhaps with campaign contributions. 56  Pace Jackson, the constitutional texts protecting
economic  liberties  are  not  systematically  more  vague  than  the  constitutional  texts
protecting  personal  liberties;  the  Takings  Clause  is  no  more  vague  than  the  First
Amendment's  protection  of the  freedom  of speech.  Indeed,  Justices  who  succeeded
Jackson invoked the same due process clauses that Jackson had condemned as hopelessly
vague, but did so in order to protect personal rather than economic liberties.
57
What  Sunstein's  commitments  do  rule out  of bounds  is  the idea  that  the crucial
issue  in  civil-liberties  controversies  should be  understood  as  the scope  of government
intervention,  or whether  social control is desirable, or whether government can be trusted
to  regulate  in  the  public  interest,  or  anything  like  that.  Translating  and  deepening
Dewey's  critique of such ideas, Sunstein has taught us that to protect civil  liberties just is
to choose one extant system of social control,  one distribution of rights to control others,
one  set  of  claims  on  government  resources,  in  preference  to  alternative  systems,
distributions  and  claims.  In  particular  contexts  a  particular  choice  may  be  welfare-
maximizing,  or not, but a claim of civil liberties has no  special  status; such  claims must
prove  their  contributions  to  welfare  just  as  do  all  other  claims.  In  virtue  of that
overriding  concern  for  the  effects  of  law  on  welfare,  Sunstein's  views,  logically
extended, imply a New Deal for civil liberties.
56.  This is a standard critique  of Kelo v. City of  New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90  (2005), which  held that
a  condemnation  followed by  sale to private  developers  for the professed  purpose  of economic  redevelopment
counted as a valid "public  use."
57.  Roe v.  Wade, 410 U.S.  113,  164  (1973);  Griswold v.  Conn.,  381  U.S.  479, 481-82  (1965);  Griswold,
381  U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J.,  concurring).
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